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It is time to move away from policy witchcraft and into an era
where evidence is taken seriously
Adrian Beecroft’s report on employment law has angered many who feel
his recommendations are partisan and seek to erode a number of worker ’s rights. John
Van Reenen argues that although the report is both timely and addresses key issues in
regulation, Beecroft appears to have ignored the wealth of research into the economic
effects of employment laws. This evidence goes against his view that relaxing employment
laws will  generate large economic improvements in the UK.
Adrian Beecrof t’s report on employment law makes some radical recommendations to
deregulate UK employment laws, f or example making it much easier to dismiss workers. When reluctantly
released in mid-May, the report generated a polit ical row as the author is a major donor to the
Conservative party and provoked Vince Cable, UK Secretary of  State f or Business and Innovation,
into dismissing the “bonkers” proposals. In reply Beecrof t labelled Cable an anti-business socialist.
I am sympathetic with the need to ref orm needless regulations and there are sensible proposals in
Beecrof t to make it easier to employ f oreign workers through f aster work permit checks and simplif ying
the immigration system. At a t ime when the UK is being perceived to be an unwelcome home to global
talent this is to be welcomed.
But the most depressing thing about the report and the rancorous public debate around it is the total
lack of  any evidence on the likely impact of  the proposals. Beecrof t claimed that GDP would increase by
5 per cent through employment law ref orms – a huge increase which would restore UK output f rom its
current posit ion of  under 4 per cent below 2008 output, back to pre-crisis levels.  Unf ortunately, this 5
per cent appears to be plucked f rom thin air, as if  by witchcraf t. There is no evidence presented at all in
the Beecrof t report to gauge such benef its. All I could f ind was a breezy sentence or two like
“Quantif ying the loss of  jobs arising f rom the burden of  regulation is an impossible task.” (p.6).
Putting aside the f act that this statement contradicts the claim of  an additional 5 per cent growth,
there is in f act a substantial body of  evidence on the economic ef f ects of  employment laws. Indeed, it
has been one of  the most studied areas in economics over the last decade or two. It is unclear whether
Beecrof t is ignorant of  this work or thinks it is entirely wrong or irrelevant. But as I discussed on the
BBC’s “More or Less” this weekend here is a more detailed summary of  the empirical evidence which, in
short, does not support Beecrof t’s assertions. For the more wonkish readers I of f er some of  the theory
later af ter f irst discussing the empirical evidence
 Empirical Evidence of the Effects of Employment Protection Laws (EPL)
The main empirical evidence on the Ef f ects of  Employment Protection Laws (EPLs) comes f rom using
indicators of  the “toughness” of  these laws and regulations. These are quantif ied by various
organizations such as the OECD and the World Bank. The OECD’s latest indicators are in Figure 1 below,
f or example. They show that the UK had the lowest degree of  protection in Europe and third lowest of  all
the countries examined by the OECD (only the US and Canada had weaker protection). This suggests
that ref orming EPL is hardly the Number 1 priority f or raising UK growth rates.
Figure 1: OECD Index of the strength of Employment Laws. UK third weakest protection of
workers, latest data (compiled in 2010)
Notes: Data are for 2009 for France and Portugal and 2008 for other countries. OECD average is the
unweighted average for the 30 countries that were members of the OECD in 2008. Source is available
online. 
Nevertheless, maybe some relaxing of  EPL could have some more modest posit ive ef f ects. The typical
approach to examine this question is to analyze what happens when employment laws are weakened and
see whether this is associated with any increase in unemployment, controlling f or other f actors that
could inf luence joblessness such as the overall state of  demand and the generosity of  unemployment
benef its, etc. Early approaches looked at a point of  t ime, but more recent approaches look
at changes over several years (both upwards and downwards) which is better as it controls f or many
country- level f actors (e.g. culture).
The bottom line? The conclusion of  the vast majority of  studies is that there is no signif icant ef f ect, i.e.
tougher EPL does not increase unemployment (but neither do they reduce them). Don’t just take my word
f or it – this was also the conclusion of  the OECD’s voluminous 2012 summary on growth policies (e.g.
p.173).
This approach was pioneered by Prof essor Stephen Nickell, now at the Of f ice of  Budget Responsibility,
when he was at the Centre f or Economic Perf ormance. For example see his summary in the
magisterial Unemployment book or classic 1997 Journal of Economic Perspectives article.  His most
recent paper on this looked at 20 countries (including the UK) f or over three decades (1961-1995)
f inding essentially zero ef f ects of  EPL on unemployment. By contrast, other labour market institutions
such as the duration and level of  benef it durations, the ef f ectiveness of  the Employment Service,
training polices and unions were important in af f ecting unemployment.  It is here, rather than EPL, which
should be the main targets f or ref orm.
Grif f ith et al (2007) took a similar approach to Nickell using more recent data between 1986 and 2000.
Their main results (e.g. Table 3 columns 1-4) actually f ound that tougher EPL reduced unemployment, but
this ef f ect was statistically insignif icant (i.e. they could not reject a zero ef f ect). By contrast, toughening
competit ion in the product market had a robust ef f ect on reducing unemployment. It would be very
surprising if  Beecrof t and his team were unaware of  this paper as one of  the co-authors, Rupert
Harrison, is currently the Chancellor of  the Exchequer’s special economic advisor (in the interests of  f ull
disclosure I should mention that I was also Rupert’s PhD supervisor). Perhaps communications between
No 10 and No 11 are not so much better than they were in the Brown-Blair years af ter all.
Firm-level Evidence
Beecrof t could argue that all this macro evidence is f lawed and could cite reasons such as (1) measuring
the laws is so hard and (2) there are so many other things happening at the country- level it is impossible
to adequately control f or them. Of  course, these problems could bias the ef f ect upwards to over-
estimate the negative ef f ect of  EPL as well as to underestimate them. Nevertheless, it is usef ul to look
at the growing micro-economic literature which examines f irms and plants rather than entire economies.
This micro evidence does not give much comf ort to Beecrof t either. There do appear to be af f ects of
EPL on f irm behaviour, but it is hard to f ind that these are suf f iciently large in magnitude to believe that
his recommendations would have any major posit ive ef f ect on GDP.
Let me take one study I have been involved in which looks at the case of  France where EPL increases
very substantially when f irms reach 50 employees. French Firms respond to the increase in costs by
choosing to remain small – there is a big spike of  f irms who are just below the threshold at 48-49
employees to avoid the regulation.  This reduces total output as many of  these f irms would like to grow
and employ more people but are deterred f rom doing so by the regulation, just as Beecrof t alleges. But
this ef f ect is not huge – very ef f icient f irms will still choose to pay the regulatory “tax” and become large.
For example, a 1,000 employee f irm is not likely to shed 950 of  its workers simply to avoid the regulation.
There is a similar story in other countries. Mario Monti has (correctly in my view) been involved in a drive
to reduce the heavy f iring costs in Italian f irms who are larger than 15 employees. As in my French study,
Torrini and Schivaldi f ound that f irms just below the 15 cut-of f  are much less likely to grow. But again, in
aggregate the ef f ects are relatively modest and cannot cause large changes in employment or output.
France and Italy are two countries where labour regulation is very tough (see Figure 1) so there is a big
room f or improvement. For the UK with a very f lexible regime already the supposed benef its of  loosening
EPL are likely to be even more minor.
The studies also highlight a f urther problem with creating more EPL exemptions f or small f irms as
Beecrof t recommends. As the regulations kick in when f irms get large they will be reluctant to grow.
These size-contingent regulations can reduce the incentives of  small f irms to become larger, ef f ectively
subsidising companies to remain inef f iciently small.
Theory: What are the pros and cons of Employment Protection Laws?
The downsides of  EPL are well rehearsed in Beecrof t. Larger f iring costs increases labour costs and so
makes employers reluctant to hire more workers which will lead to unemployment and loss of  output.
There could be more subtle ef f ects as well. Because workers know that they are less likely to be f ired
they may slack of f  and managers will try less hard to identif y and remove underperf orming employees.
Similarly, the protected “insider” workers may drive up wages, saf e in the knowledge they won’t be f ired.
Higher average wages will mean even higher employer costs and so even f ewer jobs. It might be
particularly hard f or individuals more on the f ringes of  the labour market like the young, women and long-
term unemployed.
On the other side of  the ledger, f iring costs mean that f ewer workers will be involuntarily dismissed. This
reduces the level of  unemployment in a downturn, at least temporarily. Obviously, EPL is of ten desired by
workers as it gives them greater saf ety and security (as long as they have jobs). More subtly, this benef it
may lead them to accept lower wages and this can of f set the increase in labour costs as Edward Lazear,
f ormer head of  George Bush’s Council f or Economic Advisors has argued. In some cases this can mean
that the entire additional cost of  the employment regulation is born by workers in the f orm of  lower
wages, leaving unemployment completely unaf f ected. Of  course, this ef f ect will be limited in the presence
of  binding minimum wages or high unemployment benef its.
The lower turnover f rom reduced hiring and f iring that result f rom EPL may mean that there is more
prof essionalisation of  careers. For example, f irms and workers may invest more in training as jobs are
longer and more stable. Finally, since the state pays unemployment benef its (and this social cost is
ignored by f irms when making) there may be an inef f iciently high level of  layof f s as argued by IMF Chief
Economist, Olivier Blanchard. In these circumstances EPL can sometimes act as an ef f icient “layof f  tax”.
The upshot of  this is that the theoretical ef f ects of  EPL on jobs and output is an empirical issue and
cannot be decided one way or the other based on theory or “common sense”.
Some of  the Beecrof t report is sensible such as the need to make the hiring of  f oreign workers easier
f or employers. But policy needs to be based on evidence not just on casual anecdote and assertion. Too
many of  the government’s policies seem to be based on ideology rather than pragmatism and if  Beecrof t
is an example of  policy f ormation we can see why. There is not even an attempt to engage in the wide
body of  evidence by academics and international bodies like the OECD, IMF, ILO and World Bank. At
the LSE Growth Commission we are amassing more systematic evidence of  what policies are good f or
long-term UK growth.
It ’s t ime to move away f rom policy witchcraf t and into an era where evidence is taken seriously.
Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of the British Politics and Policy blog, nor
of the London School of Economics. Please read our comments policy before posting.
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4. The level of  youth unemployment is at a record high. Policy makers should f ocus on strengthening
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